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In the last 25 years many thousands of formerly state-owned and operated firms have been 
privatized in developing and transition countries, generating over $400 billion (US) in sales 
proceeds.  In addition, thousands of firms have been transferred by privatization processes in 
which no money was raised (though a surprising number of state-owned firms remain in these 
regions). The vast majority of economic studies praise privatization’s positive impact at the 
level of the firm, as well as its positive macroeconomic and welfare contributions.  Moreover, 
contrary to popular conception, privatization has not contributed to maldistribution of income 
or increased poverty——at least in the best-studied Latin American cases.  In sum, the 
technical picture is generally positive. Nonetheless, public opinion in the less developed 
world is generally suspicious of, and often hostile to, privatization. A good part of the 
problem is that privatization has proven harder to launch, and is more likely to produce errant 
results, in low-income, institutionally weak states, particularly in the most important 
infrastructure sectors.  Privatization is hard to sell politically; it has become a lightning rod 
and handy scapegoat for all discontent related to liberalization and globalization. What is 
needed are reform mechanisms that give incentives and comfort to reputable private investors, 
that create and sustain the policy and regulatory institutions that make governments 
competent and honest partners with the private operators, while at the same time protecting 
consumers, particularly the most disadvantaged, from abuse.   
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I.    Introduction 
 
Almost 25 years have passed since Margaret Thatcher (along with some lesser-known 
pioneers) introduced, or reintroduced, privatization into economic affairs.    
 
In the ensuing quarter century, privatization— the divestiture, or transfer of ownership and/or 
operational control, of productive economic entities to private owners, operators and 
investors—has swept the world.  Perhaps as many as 100,000 firms and business units 
formerly owned and operated by governments, in every industrial, commercial and service 
sector, in every geographical region of the world, have undergone some form of the process.  
Guinea Bissau, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea and perhaps Sudan
1 are among the few 
states that have not tried privatization——and even in these countries some thought is being 
devoted to the prospect.   
 
The forms of privatization are many, ranging from outright sale of government’s entire stake, 
to partial sale, to concessions, leases, and management contracts, to the hiving off and sale of 
non-core business activities, to the opening of previously restricted sectors to new private 
entrants and competitors.  Each one of these approaches has been carried out in a variety of 
ways; the forms of privatization are numerous.
2
 
Despite its prevalence, and its popularity with finance ministers, the international financial 
institutions, and many economists who have analyzed the subject, privatization is viewed 
with suspicion and alarm by the general public, especially in developing countries.  The 
many surveys touching on the subject reveal, across all regions of the developing world, a 
fluctuating but steady majority of voices opposed to the concept, or at least holding the view 
that privatization has not been beneficial. For example, the polling firm Latinobarometro 
annually surveys reactions to economic programs and policies among 19,000 people in 18 
Latin American countries (with a combined population of more than 400 million).  The 
percentage of respondents viewing privatization negatively rose from 55 percent in 2001 to 
80 percent in 2003, and then fell back to about 70 percent in the most recent, 2005 poll.
3  
Surveys from other regions, including sub-Saharan Africa, the post-communist transition 
states, and South Asia, also show high levels of public opposition. (Kikeri and Kolo, 2005, 
22-24) 
 
To the suspicion and hostility of the general public one must add the strident anti-
privatization voices of most labor leaders, NGO activists and anti-globalization intellectuals, 
                                                 
1At least, no privatizations are recorded for these countries in the World Bank Privatization Database 
(2005), which can be accessed at http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/    
2 The many forms of privatization are not dealt with in detail in this study.  They are briefly described in the 
“Options for Privatization” section in World Bank, 1995b, 1.  The relationship between forms of privatization 
and outcomes is complex.  For one survey of this issue in post-communist, transition economies see Djankov 
and Murrell, 2002. 
3 Source: The Economist’s on-line reporting of Latinobarometro results, at   
http://www.economist.com/World/la/displayStory.cfm?story_id=5093522  4
and many journalists, academics, politicians and more than a few maverick economists.
4    
The policy has many opponents, and they are active and vocal. 
 
We shall examine below the political economy of privatization and try to explain 
privatization’s unpopularity.  The immediate point is that because privatization has been the 
most contentious item in the liberalization agenda it has also been the most studied of 
reforms:  There are evaluations of privatization’s impact on a firm’s financial and operational 
performance and returns to shareholders (Megginson and Netter, 2001), its macroeconomic 
effects, (International Monetary Fund, 2000), its consequences for economic welfare both in 
the aggregate and in terms of groups of the most affected actors in societies (Galal et al., 
1994), and its social and distributional impact (Nellis and Birdsall, 2005).  In addition, there 
are dozens of case, sectoral, country and regional studies, and detailed analyses of just about 
every technical aspect of the issue.
5   
 
However, all this analysis has not produced a settled body of opinion on the costs and 
benefits of the process.  The debate over privatization’s impact and utility continues to rage; 
and the number of polemical statements for and especially against privatization (e.g., Kahn 
and Minnich, 2005) continues to mount.  The purpose of this paper is to take stock of this 
process as it has been applied in developing and post-communist countries; to summarize, in 
a reasonably accessible manner, what is known, both pro and con, and what is not known 
about privatization in these parts of the world.  
 
The approach is as follows.  The first part of Section II presents reasons why privatization 
has been employed.  The second part sums up the amount of privatization carried out in 
developing and transition countries in the last 15 years——but notes the surprisingly large 
amount and high value of assets that remain in the hands of states in less developed countries.  
The third portion of Section II discusses privatization’s impact on a firm’s financial and 
operational performance, the efficiency of resources employed, and returns to shareholders; 
that is, the microeconomic issues.  The final part of Section II reviews the broader fiscal, 
macroeconomic and welfare impacts of privatization.  
 
Section III looks at caveats to and concerns about the perceived impacts, noting the economic 
sectors (e.g., infrastructure) and geographical regions (e.g., low income areas and some 
transition states) where the findings are less positive in favor of privatization.  It then reviews 
the complex relationship between economic institutions and privatization processes and 
outcomes. 
 
Section IV looks at privatization’s impact on income distribution and poverty.  Section V 
discusses the political economy of privatization, in particular, the “disconnect” between the 
generally positive technical/economist assessments and the public’s hostility to privatization.  
Section VI  concludes.  
 
                                                 
4 And some not so maverick:  Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, for example, has criticized the concept and practice 
of privatization, in both developed and developing economies, as hastily conceived and poorly implemented.  
5 A handy bibliographical source on privatization is “papers and links” section in the privatization portion of the 
World Bank’s Rapid Response Unit:  http://rru.worldbank.org/PapersLinks/  5
II. What  has  happened? 
 
    a.  Why Privatize? 
 
Why did privatization rise (or, more accurately, return) to prominence?    
 
The trend of the first three-quarters of 20
th century was state intervention in productive 
aspects of the economy, not withdrawal.  From 1900 to 1975 the world witnessed:  The 
spread of the socialist ideology and then the imposition of communism in the Soviet Union 
(and later China and a number of other states); enormous social and economic burdens 
imposed by repeated, protracted and worldwide wars; the near-breakdown of the capitalist 
system during the great depression; and the post-WW II disintegration of European colonial 
empires and their replacement by regimes, few of which initially had ties to private economic 
actors.  These summary factors led many governments, overtly socialist and otherwise, to 
adopt interventionist economic programs.  A prime operational principle of these programs 
was the public ownership and management of productive entities, especially in infrastructure.   
 
Through the first two-thirds of the century, these “public enterprises” grew in number, size 
and significance, accounting, on worldwide average, for over 10 percent of GDP by the 
1970s. Average percentages in developing countries surpassed 15 percent, with much higher 
figures in overtly socialist and communist economies. 
 
A number of public enterprises performed well—but not enough.  They generally failed to 
live up to the expectations of creators and financiers.  Numerous studies and reports from the 
1970s through the 1990s documented their shortcomings.
6  Rather than contribute to state 
budgets, public enterprises drained them.  A high percentage failed to produce a sufficient 
quantity or a high quality of service or product. Particularly troublesome was a widespread 
failure to charge cost-covering tariffs in infrastructure/utility public enterprises; subsidies 
from government and soft budgets kept them afloat.  These flows eventually posed large 
financial burdens on government budgets—and attracted the attention of the international 
financial institutions and donors.                    
                                                                                                                     
The fundamental problem of public firms was multiple, ambiguous and conflicting 
objectives.  To illustrate: Government owners decreed that public enterprises operate in a 
commercial, efficient and profitable manner.  At the same time they insisted that they finance 
their actions with debt rather than equity, provide goods and services at prices less than cost, 
generate employment, receive their inputs from state-sanctioned suppliers, choose plant 
location on political rather than commercial criteria, hire their staff on the basis of who rather 
than what they knew, etc.  The mixing of social and political with economic objectives 
weakened managerial autonomy, commercial performance, and efficiency.   
 
                                                 
6 A summation of the nature and causes of public enterprise performance problems was found in the World 
Bank’s Bureaucrats in Business (1995a).   6
Repeated efforts to solve these problems by means other than changing ownership produced 
good results in a few settings (e.g., Chile, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand), modest results in 
many (e.g., Egypt, the Philippines, Ghana), and little or none in far too many others.
7   
 
Even when results were positive, they tended not to last.  Repeatedly it was demonstrated that 
proper information and monitoring systems, incentives and financial discipline could be 
introduced in public enterprises.  But too often, as the precipitating financial crisis eased, as 
another, more socio-political crisis replaced it, as the dynamic reformers who had brought 
about the improvements moved on to other areas and interests, then the capacity and will to 
impose painful reforms faded.  Political interference resurfaced, poor performance 
reemerged, and the gains from reforming policies and leaders dissipated. 
 
As disappointment with enterprise reform mounted, government and donor enthusiasm grew 
concerning privatization.  In retrospect, this enthusiasm was generated as much or more by 
the modest results of performance improvement approaches other than divestiture, by the 
privatization examples of Britain and a few other OECD countries, and by expectations based 
on hope and theory, rather than on hard empirical evidence of the superiority of private 
participation and ownership in non-industrial economies. Thus, the shift to privatization was 
something of a leap of faith––––but it was carried out.
8   
 
  b.   How much privatization has taken place, and where? 
 
Tables 1 through 4, below, indicate the scope of divestitures in developing and transition 
countries since 1990.  In these regions total revenues from privatization topped $400 billion 
U.S. The number is impressively large.  Even so, the use of cash transactions and sales 
proceeds as indicators greatly underestimates the scope of privatization:   Recall that in 
transition countries, literally thousands of firms—15,000 in Russia; 4,500 in Mongolia 
alone—were divested for vouchers, meaning no revenues were raised by the seller.  These 
privatizations are not accounted for in the tables. 
 
                                                 
7 For a review of public enterprise reforms other than privatization, see Shirley and Nellis, 1991. 
8 We shall not in this exercise show precisely how this was done.     7
Table 1 
























   





































Number of transactions Total proceeds
 
  Source:    Kikeri and Kolo, 2005, p.6.  Again, note that the  
    transaction numbers refer to the firms sold for cash. 
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Table 3 








LAC ECA EAP MENA SAS SSA
1990-1999 2000-2003
 
Source:  World Bank, 2005.  LAC = Latin America/Caribbean; ECA = Europe/Central Asia; EAP = East Asia/Pacific; 







Privatization Numbers & Proceeds, by Region, 1990-2003 
REGION #   TRANSACTIONS   PROCEEDS (US $ 
BNS.)
Middle East, North 
Africa 
                    302                             $18.9 
South Asia                      399                      $15.4 
East Asia/Pacific                      417                      $65.8  
Sub-Saharan Africa                      981                      $11.5 
Latin America, 
Caribbean 
                 1,265                    $195.1 
East & Central Europe, 
Central Asia 
                 5,634                    $104.1 
          Totals                   8,998                    $410.8 
Compiled by the author from the World Bank Privatization Database, 2005. 
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c.   Is anything left to privatize? 
 
Given the extent to which privatization has been advanced by indigenous reformers and the 
international financial institutions, one might think the process is substantially completed; 
that most governments around the world have just about finished  divesting everything they 
had to sell or transfer.  This is not the case.  True, in some states the percentage of economic 
activity accounted for by public enterprises has fallen dramatically; e.g., in Russia and many 
other post-socialist countries; in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and a few other Latin American 
nations; and, more surprisingly, in China.  Nonetheless, a very large number of productive 
entities, including many of the larger and more valuable firms in energy, infrastructure and 
finance, remain in the hands of the state.  The World Bank estimates that, on average, as 
much as 50 percent of these important sectors remain publicly owned and operated in its 
client countries.   
 
As Table 4 (above) shows, this retention of control by the  state is  more prevalent in the 
Middle East and North Africa and South Asia than in other regions.  In Algeria, for example, 
65 percent of all value-added is still produced by public enterprises, and 90 percent of all 
banking is state owned and operated.  In Algeria, Syria and Iran, up to 80 percent of the 
industrial sector is state-owned and operated. Across the region, energy exploration and 




Does it make any difference that some developing countries have lagged the leading 
privatizers?  Given the recent shift away from dogmatic promotion of ownership change, 
perhaps caution was the correct course of action, particularly regarding infrastructure.   
Possibly, the slow pace and limited scope of privatization allowed these more cautious states 
to avoid the mistakes that followed in the wake of wholesale ownership transformation in the 
absence of legal safeguards (Russia), or infrastructure privatizations elsewhere in the absence 
of effective regulatory institutions.  Perhaps keeping the largest firms in state hands until the 
institutional framework is more solid will lead to the attraction of better buyers, higher sales 
prices, and better, more socially palatable outcomes? 
   
Perhaps——but just as likely not.  Many obstacles stand in the way of the fulfillment of this 
strategy.  First, it will take a long time, during which public enterprise performance may, 
indeed is likely to, deteriorate further.  Second, it will thus be expensive.  Most governments 
are finding it more difficult than ever to provide their infrastructure firms with the capital 
needed for long-delayed maintenance, much less expansion.  Much of the improvement 
resulting from privatization has come from the ability of new private owners to tap private 
capital markets.  Strained public and/or official funding will not be sufficient to meet repair 
and expansion needs.  Private operators are more able to raise investment capital, both from 
private markets and from official sources.
9
 
                                                 
9 That is, as the IFIs revive lending to infrastructure reform, they will be looking for, or actively putting in place, 
private operators if not owners.   10
Third, some of those advocating slow reform and continued state involvement do so not out 
of a desire to minimize pain and build institutions, but rather as a pretext to protect their 
ideological positions, political prerogatives and economic rents.  They push for slow 
privatization; they intend no privatization.  This may not be sensible from an economic 
perspective; unfortunately, it often makes good political sense (see Section V). 
 
d.  Impact:  Microeconomic 
 
The best-studied aspects of privatization are its effects at the level of the firm.  The vast 
majority of studies report post-privatization increases in profitability, efficiency
10 and returns 
to shareholders.
11   In their extensive survey, Megginson and Netter (2001) estimate that 
these positive effects occur in from two-thirds to three-quarters of privatizations assessed, a 
remarkably high rate of success.  With the qualifications discussed below, this finding is 
robust across regions, countries and economic sectors.  The microeconomic studies show 
improved post-privatization performance in both industrialized and developing countries, and 
in most manufacturing, commercial, industrial and service sectors.  For example, an Inter-
American Development Bank review of privatization in six Latin American countries
12 found 
an average increase in profits (return on sales) of 29.8 percent in a large sample of privatized 
firms.  Efficiency gains, as measured by output per worker or ratio of costs to sales, increased 
on average by 67 percent. Output increases averaged 34 percent, “regardless of the indicator 
used.”  (IADB, 2002, 3)   
 
Note that it is not fully understood just why privatization produces, or is associated with, 
these improvements.  Economic theory, either in its neo-classical or amended forms, offers 
“no clear picture…of a definite advantage of private ownership.” (Roland, 2004, 21)   
Analysts point to improved information to and incentives for managers, greater access to 
capital market resources and pressures, increased isolation from political interference, and 
increased flexibility to deal with labor and other cost concerns, as likely sources of the 
improvements.  Doubtless, all are at times of great import.   
 
The problem is that privatization is almost never introduced as a stand-alone reform.  It is 
usually part of a package of liberalizing policy changes that increase openness and 
competition at the same time that private ownership is introduced.  This makes it hard to 
determine the extent to which ownership change in and of itself accounts for the 
improvements seen; it may be that increased competitive pressures are an equal or better 
explanation for the altered behavior. (Tandon, 1995)  Whatever the underlying cause, the fact 
remains that firm performance most often does improve. 
 
                                                 
10 Usually measured in terms of labor productivity, but sometimes by total factor productivity tests. 
11 What economists call “selection bias” may be at work in these findings.  The term has two meaning:  First is 
the possibility that it is not privatization that improves firm performance, it is, rather, that the highest potential 
firms are selected to be privatized—thus skewing the findings in favor of divestiture.  The second possibility is 
that the analyst consciously or unconsciously selects for study the better performing privatized firms. This 
concern rose most acutely in privatization in the transition states.  For discussions of selection bias and ways to 
test for and overcome it, see Marcincein and Van Wijnbergen, 1997; and Frydman et al., 1999. 
12 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.    11
e  . Impact:  Macroeconomic and Welfare 
 
Concerning the fiscal and macroeconomic impacts of privatization, the IMF found that in a 
set of 18 developing and transition economies
13 privatization proceeds were large, that the 
net
14 receipts were saved (generally meaning that they were used to retire debt) rather than 
quickly spent, and that governments’ fiscal positions benefited from privatization:  Gross 
budgetary transfers to the firms and sectors undergoing privatization declined, as did general 
deficits and quasi-fiscal operations.  Though they found a “strong correlation….between 
privatization and growth,” (Davis et al., 2000, p. 2)  the authors noted that privatization  
 
….is not the suggested cause of the large increases in growth rates (in the sample 
countries)….Rather, it is likely that privatization is serving as a proxy in these 
regressions for a range of structural measures that may be characterized as a change 
in economic regime.  (Davis et al., 2000, p. 23) 
 
More simply put, there is an association between privatization and increased growth, but 
whether—or the extent to which—privatization causes growth is not known.  In a similar 
vein, for transition states the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development detects a 
strong correlation between the total amount of privatization and the rapidity and strength of 
the return to growth. (EBRD, 2004)    
 
Other regional and particularly country case studies paint a more nuanced picture.  For Latin 
America as a whole, Campos et al. (2003, p. 165)  find that the effects of privatization of 
infrastructure on regional GDP per capita are “…neutral at worst and most probably 
positive..” However, it may produce a decline in public sector accounts, thus casting doubt 
on the argument that privatization generates “fiscal space” for selling governments.  For 
example, in Brazil in the 1990s, huge resources were generated by privatizations.  Post-sale, 
firm financial performance improved.  But Macedo (2000 and 2005) argues that the Brazilian 
government used the proceeds on current expenditure rather than debt relief, thus increasing 
the fiscal deficits.  It then compounded the problem by adopting high interest rates, in a 
fruitless effort to defend the Brazilian real. Macedo concludes that government misused the 
privatization revenues to soften its public and external debt constraints, thus weakening the 
economy.  A good part of the close to $80 billion in privatization inflows in Brazil in the 
1990s “…went down the drain in the disarray of public finances.” (Macedo, 2000)  Knight-
John and Athukorala (2005) make a similar argument in the case of Sri Lanka’s use of 
privatization proceeds, though they note that after 1995 government began using 
privatization revenues to retire debt rather than add to current consumption.   
 
A number of other studies demonstrate that privatization has put substantial resources in the 
hands of divesting governments.  They conclude that it provides an opportunity for 
                                                 
13 Argentina, Bolivia, Cote d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Uganda, Ukraine and Vietnam.  For additional assessment of 
the IMF’ in privatization, see Brune et al., 2004. 
 
14 Net proceeds average about half of gross proceeds, reflecting the high costs of sales; that is, debt and 
environmental clean ups, generous severance, retraining and sometimes settlement packages, and high fees 
charged by transaction facilitators and advisors.   12
governments to put their fiscal houses in order, and redirect expenditure from non-productive 
subsidization to more socially beneficial uses.  As noted, advocates speak of the fiscal space 
that privatization will or should create.    
 
But privatization does not guarantee that the opportunities will be seized, that the funds will 
be wisely applied.  A key question is, what uses do governments actually make of the 
generally large, but one-time or short-term gains?  The IMF concluded the funds were not 
generally wasted, but it did not specify the revised allocations of expenditures.  Mckenzie 
and Mookherjee note that government spending on health and education in Mexico increased 
by 50 percent in the period of peak privatization revenues; that similar social spending in 
Argentina also increased following privatization (and the reduction of spending on debt 
servicing); and that Bolivia earmarked a portion of privatization revenues to capitalize a 
national pension fund and make special payments to all citizens over 65.  (Mckenzie and 
Mookherjee, 2005, p. 72)  These are but scattered impressions; the subject requires wider, 
much more detailed investigation. 
 
  Welfare Effects 
 
Improved performance in firms does not sufficiently measure privatization’s utility.  A 
privatized firm may be doing better while the economy is doing worse.  This may occur due 
to the firm’s exploitation of a monopoly position, or to government policies, protections, 
special arrangements or even illegal actions that give the firm an advantage.  Its superior 
performance (and even its greater contribution to government revenues through increased tax 
payments) might be coming about at the expense of competitors or taxpayers. In short, firm 
and/or government financial performance might be improved only because of costs imposed 
elsewhere in the broader economy. 
 
This notion is straight-forward, but determining whether and to what extent there is 
agreement or deviation between the narrow and broad impacts of a privatization is complex. 
To address this issue, economists use concepts derived from welfare economics, combined 
with techniques drawn from social cost-benefit analysis.  They ask not simply whether the 
position of the firm or the government or any single actor has improved or worsened due to 
privatization, but rather:  What was the privatization’s impact on the economy as a whole; 
what significant economic variables have changed as a result of the privatization, and only as 
a result of the privatization?  They then ask, do the changes brought about by privatization 
result in  gains or losses for relevant actors in the economy—the divesting government, 
consumers, workers, the buyers, competitors—and, if so, how are they distributed among 
them; i.e., who are the winners and the losers from the process?  After estimating the total 
loss or gain, and the distribution of the loss or gain, one can calculate the overall economic 
impact of a privatization. 
 
The seminal work employing this approach is that of Galal et al. (1994)  Later works in this 
vein include those of Newbery and Pollitt (1997), Jones, Jamal and Gökgür (1998),  Domah 
and Pollitt  (2000), and a number of works in progress on African cases by Gökgür, Jammal 
and Jones (2005). 
     13
To answer the question of what changes were brought about by privatization (and, to repeat, 
only by privatization), all of these works construct a “counterfactual.”  This is an estimate of 
what would have happened if privatization had not taken place, and the publicly owned firm 
had continued in operation. Analysts readily admit that counterfactual construction is 
demanding and difficult.  Even the most careful estimate of what would likely have happened 
requires a bit of “crystal ball gazing.”
15  For the counterfactual to be transparent and 
persuasive, the assumptions used in its construction must be plausible; for example, that 
technology coming on line after the privatization would (or would not) have been adopted by 
the public firm.  Small or seemingly innocuous assumptions can make a large difference in 
projected outcomes.  One is in effect constructing hypothetical history.   
 
Perhaps because of these difficulties, welfare analysis based on elaborate and systematic 
counterfactuals has been applied in only a limited number of cases.  However, note that 
almost all of the studies so carried out report substantial aggregate welfare gains from 
privatization for the economies in question.
16  The same positive conclusion is reached by the 
larger number of other studies calculating welfare consequences with less elaborate 
counterfactuals or by totally different methods.
17  Thus, empirical analysts answer “yes” to 
the question, does privatization contribute positively to the overall economy?  How these 
aggregate gains are distributed among relevant actors and income groups is discussed below 
in Section IV. 
 
 
III.   Caveats and Institutions 
 
So, in the main and on average, privatization produces positive microeconomic results. But 
not always.  Where and when does privatization not work, or work less well?  Experience 
reveals two major caveats, and one corollary.  First, privatization is less likely to succeed in 
low-income countries, or in settings where markets are embryonic, due either to their never 
having been established or having been suppressed; i.e., some post-communist countries.
18 
Second, privatization is harder to carry out and is more likely to produce questionable or 
negative effects in the natural monopoly segments of utilities/infrastructure services (and in 
                                                 
15 The phrase is David Newbery’s; other analysts agree: “In a study of this sort, innumerable choices of 
parameter values and other assumptions are made on the basis of judgments or educated guesses.  This 
obviously leaves a lot of room for subjectivity.”  (Galal et al., 1994, p. 536) 
16 Galal et al. found substantial welfare increases in 11 of 12 privatizations examined, from Great Britain, 
Mexico, Malaysia and Chile.  Newbery and Pollitt found the same for the case of Britain’s electricity industry, 
and Dommah and Pollitt confirmed the British results, and expanded them to Wales.  Jones, Jammal and Gökgür 
found welfare increases from Cote d’Ivoire’s privatization program as a whole. 
17See for example, Arocena (2001; Spain), Barja, Mckenzie and Urquiola (2005; Bolivia), Chisari, Estache and 
Romero (1999; Argentina), Delfino and Casarin (2001; Argentina), Ennis and Pinto (2005; Argentina), Fischer 
et al. (2003; Chile), Rodriguez and Rivas (2005; Nicaragua), Galiani et al. (2003: Argentina),  Mckenzie and 
Mookherjee (2005; summation), Paredes (2001; Chile),  Toba (2003;  Philippines); Torero and Pasco-Font 
(2001; Peru), and Torero, Schroth and Pasco-Font (2005; Peru). 
18 This statement does not contradict the EBRD findings, above, of the positive impact of privatization in the 
transition region.  The transition countries that have done privatization well are those in the western section of 
the region; i.e., those that historically been part of capitalist markets and traditions.  The farther east one moves 
in the region, the more difficult and problematic privatization becomes.   14
banks and insurance companies, where some aspects of the firms’ functioning require 
government rule-setting and monitoring to protect consumers and depositors).  
The evident corollary is that difficulties are most likely to surface when these two situations 
are combined; i.e., when privatizing an infrastructure or financial public enterprise in a low-
income or post-communist country.  Common difficulties include: 
•  Private operators and investors often find that records and accounts of the firm, on 
which they based their offer, are inaccurate or completely false, particularly with 
regard to the state of assets and the collection of tariffs; 
•  that some liabilities were not disclosed; 
•  that government will not or cannot accede to tariff increases called for in a 
formula agreed to in the contract;  
•  that local courts will not or cannot assist in enforcing agreements, or assist in 
maintaining shareholders’ rights; or, on the other hand, 
•  that the private provider makes a low bid to get a foot in the door and then, 
pointing to informational and institutional deficiencies, claims an inability to meet 




The underlying reason for both the sectoral and the geographical problems is the same:  For 
markets to function in an efficient, productive and socially acceptable manner, a set of legal, 
policy and behavioral underpinnings—referred to as “economic institutions”—must be 
present and operating.  These institutions promote, monitor, and render transparent market 
operations.  They include: 
•  The definition and protection of property rights; 
•  Contract enforcement and commercial dispute settlement through credible, 
predictable, peaceful means (more broadly, court decisions that are timely and 
based on law, not payments or social precedence);  
•  Independent, well-staffed agencies to regulate the natural monopoly elements of 
private utilities (that deliver timely, law-based decisions, predictable and credible 
for both investors and consumers);  
•  Functioning bankruptcy/insolvency regimes for firms operating in competitive 
markets; and, in general, 
•  A public administration that meets modicum standards of predictability, 
competence and probity and promotes and enforces rules enhancing competition. 
 
These institutions stabilize and render predictable market operations; they thus lower 
transaction costs. Where they are absent or weak, privatization is more likely to result in poor 
outcomes—particularly in the case of infrastructure/network industries, and particularly with 
regard to distributional concerns.  Thus, the more extensive the institutional underpinnings, 
the better the privatization results, in both efficiency and equity terms (e.g., Chile versus 
Argentina, Hungary versus Russia).   
 
The idea that institutions heavily influence economic vitality has rapidly risen to the status of 
conventional wisdom. The association between the existence and performance of economic 
institutions and good results from privatization is widely predicated. (Stiglitz, 1999a and   15
1999b)   Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) go further; they argue that “the quality of 
institutions ‘trumps’ everything else” in explaining all economic development outcomes—
while admitting that the finding is at such a high level of generality that it provides little 
specific guidance to policymakers.   
 
The lack of operational precision is the problem:  The list of needed institutions is very long, 
and the concepts very general. Explanations of how these institutions come into being and 
attain a state of effectiveness are lacking or vague.  Research is just beginning on which 
institutions are crucial in what particular circumstances, or in what sequence they should and 
can be introduced.  And while most of these policies/institutions function under at least the 
partial control of the public sector, and while many donor-supported efforts are underway to 
create and strengthen institutions in developing and transition countries,
19 it is, again, unclear 
as to what governments can do to aid their emergence and enhance their capacity.  As Shirley 
(2003, 1) notes, “…over time the development paradigm has shifted from ‘get your prices 
right’ to ‘get your institutions right;’ the latter instruction has proved as useless as the 
former.”    
 
So:  One cannot simply state that institutions are required, note their presence or absence, and 
legislate them into existence and competence.  This leads to the key dilemma:  The countries 
that stand to benefit most from liberalizing reform and privatization are those with the lowest 
incomes, the weakest institutions and the worst public sectors.  In such settings, the 
efficiency and financial gains from private operation are potentially very great.  At the same 
time, the risks are high that the reform processes will be mismanaged or captured, and 
produce suboptimal or errant results.
20  
 
Up until the late 1990s, the extent to which institutions influenced privatization processes and 
outcomes was underestimated by most (though not all) of those involved.  Placing ownership 
change before institution-building proved costly in low-income developing states, and even 
more so in the post-communist transition states. There, speedy privatization had been 
recommended by the bulk of analysts and insisted upon by the IFIs.  The idea was that 
capitalism required capitalists; many of them, and fast.  Ownership change was seen as 
“…not just a necessary condition of capitalism, but a sufficient one.”  (Kornai, 2000, p. 15)   
 
This led to the belief that the required legal/institutional frameworks would arise from 
demand by the new owners of private property.  In the transition states, privatization’s 
proponents failed to realize that in the absence of a supporting legal framework, it was more 
rational, in the short run, for individual property owners to buy a private police force rather 
than to band together to help build a law enforcement regime supporting free and fair 
business operations.  In a number of low-income countries, infrastructure firms were leased 
                                                 
19 Especially in the creation and reinforcement of legal/judicial systems. 
20 This conclusion is statistical rather than comprehensive; one is talking about tendencies. That is, privatizing an 
infrastructure monopoly in a low income, institutionally weak country is certainly much more dangerous than 
doing so in a high income industrialized state, and one can cite a number of cases where such privatizations have 
gone badly wrong——for recent example, in the failed concessions of water companies in Tanzania, Uganda 
and Mozambique.  However, in Tanzania, the quite similar concession of the container terminal is an 
outstanding success.  Low income levels and weak institutions hinder good outcomes, but do not guarantee bad 
ones.     16
or given in concession to private operators on the assumption that private operation could not 
help but be superior to public management.  But the public sector mechanisms needed (i) to 
attract to the bidding process a good number of reputable and competent private operators 
and (ii) to construct, and especially monitor and enforce their performance contracts, were 
absent, weak or easily corrupted.   
 
By the end of the 1990s, dissatisfaction grew over corrupt transactions in transition countries 
(mainly in commercial firms), and ineffective ones in developing countries (centered on 
infrastructure cases).  This led to considerable rethinking about the pace and techniques 
employed in privatization.
21  Many previously known for their strong support of privatization 
admitted to errors and doubts. The IMF and World Bank, that for a decade had pushed 




The importance of economic institutions, the limitations of ownership change as a stand-
alone reform, and the need to modify the excessive optimism of the 1990s regarding 
privatization, are now well and widely recognized.  The proposed solution is “public-private 
partnerships,” but the term is vaguely defined; it is quite unclear as to how workable 
partnerships will emerge, what they will look like, and in what precise ways they will differ 
from what has already been tried.  Specificity is lacking on how future reforms will avoid the 
errors of the past, with regard to both public enterprise reform and privatization.   
 
 
IV.    Privatization’s Social Impact     
 
Some critics may concede that privatization is of economic benefit, but all question its social 
utility.  They argue that privatization’s rewards go to the agile, the rich, the foreign and the 
corrupt, at the expense of poor and honest nationals. They claim that privatization negatively 
affects the mass of citizens——that it harms workers because of lost jobs, consumers 
because of higher prices, and taxpayers in general, because of government under pricing of 
assets, the collusion of crooked bureaucrats with buyers, or the inability of ill-trained and 
underpaid public servants to see through the stratagems of clever private investors.  The 
overall claim is that privatization contributes to inequality and poverty. 
 
Certainly, privatization does generally result in job losses:  150,000 in Argentina between 
1987 and 1997; roughly 50 percent of all employees in firms privatized in Mexico in the 
1990s; a reduction of more than 90,000 from peak employment levels in privatized Brazilian 
railways alone; the dismissal through privatization of 15 percent of the total labor force in 
Nicaragua, to cite just a few Latin American cases.  Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002) 
                                                 
21Nellis discusses this rethinking in transition countries (2002) and sub-Saharan Africa (2005).  Note that in the 
transition region, some analysts justify privatization, warts and all.  They argue that the unjust initial distribution 
of assets was a regrettable but unavoidable price that had to be paid to get these economies into, or back into, the 
market system; that Russian privatization in particular, though morally deplorable, was better than leaving the 
firms in state control.  (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000) 
22 A July, 2005, World Bank paper, Infrastructure development:  The roles of the private and the public sector, 
describes the Bank’s shift to a more pragmatic position, away from its 1990s view that the state has little role to 
play in infrastructure industries.   17
show that employee numbers are reduced in many firms prior to sale, and that, worldwide, on 
average, 4 of 5 surveyed firms decrease employees further after sale. Surely, this amount of 
job loss, falling on those whose main source of income is wages, must result in increased 
poverty and increased inequality of incomes? 
 
The second claim is that privatization and private sector involvement raise the prices for 
essential goods and services, especially water, sewerage, electricity and transport.  There is 
no dispute that under state ownership many governments set utility prices at less than cost-
covering levels.  The frequent result was scarcity, rationing, and state firms starved of 
investment and expansion capital.  Thus, price increases are often unavoidable if the firm is 
to modernize, expand to meet demand, and operate without—or with smaller—subsidies.  
But critics argue that the size and speed of price adjustments imposed following privatization 
are often excessive and unjustified, and they decry the supposed harsh impact on low-income 
consumers.  For example, in the short-lived Cochabamba concession in Bolivia, water prices 
for poorer consumers rose after privatization by 43 percent on average, and doubled for a 
small segment of poor consumers. (McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2005, p. 49)   What is a 
bearable annoyance for upper income people might be an insurmountable, inequality 
enhancing financial burden for the poor. 
 
Third, it is evident that some of the investors willing to bid on privatizations in situations of 
poor information and worse governance are entrepreneurs more of the buccaneer than the 
Fortune 500 type.  And, of course, even the most reputable investors will take all legally 
available steps to reduce risks and ensure and maximize profits.   
 
Efforts of investors to influence bid outcomes, obtain costly and sometimes illegal 
concessions and terms (pre- and post-bid), or collude to reduce the price offered, are often 
alleged.   For a rare example that found its way into print:  The Financial Times (May 21, 
2003, p. 32) reported an alleged collusion and rigging between two bidders in the 1998 sale 
of Electropaulo Metropolitana, an electricity utility in Sao Paulo, Brazil. The accusation was 
that, in return for not bidding for the concession, the non-bidder would be given a major 
contract to build a generation plant for the winning bidder—who, in the absence of a 
competitor, could and did offer the minimum price for the utility stipulated in the bidding 
documents.   The FT cited reports that the winning bidder had come to the final meeting 
prepared to offer $500 million USD more than the $1.78 billion bid it eventually submitted; 
but put in the lower offer at the last second, once it was clear the only competitor was not 
going to bid.  All parties that could be contacted by the FT denied any illegality; the 
Brazilian government was reported to be considering legal action.   
 
Even where no illegalities appear to be involved, it can be difficult for beleaguered civil 
servants to strike a fair deal with canny and powerful investors. As a Tanzanian official put it, 
“they (the private bidders) came to negotiate with 10 lawyers from London; we had me.”  
Prima facie, there are reasons to worry about the social impact of these three elements of 
privatization.   
   18
Counterargument 
 
But the latest empirical research dilutes many of the claims that privatization adds to 
inequality and poverty.  Several recent studies examine the effects of privatization on income 
groups.  They move beyond assessments of privatization’s impact on a neighborhood, a city, 
or the employees of a particular firm being privatized.  They quantitatively estimate the direct 
and indirect, short and medium term, distributional effects of ownership change.
23
 
For example, McKenzie and Mookherjee (2005) summarize the distributional impact of 10 
infrastructure privatizations in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua.  They calculate 
that  these privatizations: 
•  Contributed only slightly to rising general unemployment levels (except in 
Nicaragua, which went through a transition akin to those in formerly communist 
states);  
•  Increased access to services, and that this access was disproportionately 
concentrated in the lower income groups.   
Looking specifically at the impact of privatization on income equality and poverty levels, 
they conclude that: 
•  “….privatization has a very small effect on inequality” (on average privatization 
is responsible for increases in Gini coefficients in the four countries of 0.02 or 
less); and that 
•  “privatization either reduced poverty or has no effect on it.”   
 
The reasons behind these findings are: (i) the direct unemployment effects of privatization 
are small in relation to the total workforce, and tend to be offset in the medium term by 
increased job creation produced in part by privatization; and (ii) increased access offsets any 
negative effects of higher prices.
24  The numbers of workers laid off due to privatization are 
small, even in Argentina or Mexico, relative to the entire workforce.  In the cases reviewed 
the number of new private sector jobs created by the general reform program, of which 
privatization was a part, soon exceeded the number dismissed.  General and enduring 
increases in overall unemployment levels in these countries are real and troublesome; but 
they came some time after privatization and were caused by external shocks, labor market 
                                                 
23They do this by examining differences in household expenditure and consumption for a service—such as 
water—by income group, before and after privatization.  This approach requires survey data from before and 
after the sale.  There are limitations to the approach:  Most countries possess only a few surveys; most survey 
only urban, not rural residents; these surveys usually show amounts spent on a service and not amounts 
consumed; the questions in and coverage of some surveys vary over time within the same country. There are 
also problems in calculating price shifts over time; different studies reach different conclusions. The 
methodological issues, and the techniques devised to overcome shortcomings, are discussed in McKenzie and 
Mookherjee (2005).   The detailed country cases for Argentina, Bolivia and Nicaragua, on which Mckenzie and 
Mookherjee draw, are also found (along with Mckenzie and Mookherjee)  in Nellis and Birdsall, 2005. 
24 That is, the positive distributional impact of increased access to privatized utility services far outweighs any 
negative impact of increased tariffs—where indeed the tariffs did actually increase, which was only half the time 
in the cases reviewed.  Note, however, that a  separate study of the impact of private provision of water on 
access, in Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil, concluded that while access rose under private provision, it increased 
by just about the same amount in areas that maintained public provision.  In addition, this study could not find 
any differences in increased coverage among the poor between the public and private providers.  (Clarke et al., 
2004)   19
rigidities, and financial indiscipline—not privatization.  It has even been argued that, in Latin 
America, privatization may have mitigated unemployment; that is, absent privatization, 
unemployment levels would be higher. (Behrman, Birdsall, Szekely, 2000)   
 
All this calls into question the portrayal of privatization as a prime cause of growing 
inequality and poverty.  But perhaps these findings only apply to Latin America; perhaps the 
economic environments and privatization processes adopted in other countries and regions 
have produced more negative results?  Given the discussion on institutions above, this seems 
plausible.  The fact is, we do not know for sure, because almost no similar studies have yet 
been carried out in these other regions.
25  This author’s guess is that the distributional impact 
in other regions would resemble that found in Latin America, except in the countries that 
were once in the Soviet Union, and perhaps in the institutionally weakest African states.   
 
However, even if a dozen studies confirming the McKenzie and Mookherjee conclusions in 
other regions were to shortly appear, it is unlikely that this would alter greatly the public’s 
negative perception of privatization.  The problem is that the argument is not being fought 
strictly or even mainly on empirical economic and financial grounds; the reasons for the 
unpopularity of privatization are fundamentally political in nature.  
 
 
V:  The Political Economy of Privatization: Explaining the “Disconnect” 
 
So:  Privatization usually results in improved performance in the affected firm.  Its 
macroeconomic impact is generally assessed as positive, at the very least in the sense of 
providing governments with opportunities, and being correlated closely with increased 
growth and aggregate welfare.  Data from the best-studied cases show that privatization’s 
impact on poverty and income distribution is, in many instances, negligible, and  far less 
negative than popular perception would have it.   
 
Why then is the policy so widely, so vehemently, so persistently disliked?  As with many 
economic issues, a good part of the explanation is that privatization’s benefits are dispersed, 
while its costs are concentrated. 
 
That is, privatization’s benefits for consumers at large tend to be dispersed among 
amorphous, unorganized segments of the public.  The average benefits are small for each 
affected consumer.  Mass benefits occur in the medium term, or at least they accrue to a 
significant size in the medium term.   
 
To illustrate:  In several Latin American cases, post-privatization average real electricity 
tariffs declined by 5—10 percent, and there are numerous cases, worldwide, of even larger 
reductions in average real telephone bills.  In the aggregate, these savings are substantial and 
worthwhile gains for any economy.  And increased disposable income by a few dollars a 
                                                 
25 For three reasons:  (1) Regions other than LAC have fewer infrastructure privatizations, and those they have 
are relatively recent.  (2) Other regions have fewer and less sophisticated household expenditure and 
consumption surveys to draw on; their existence is crucial to this form of analysis.  (3) Other regions have less 
dense networks of local economists at ease with the complex measurement techniques required.    20
billing period (along with service quality improvements, lowered pollution, and a number of 
other social gains that often come in the wake of privatization) is no doubt welcome by the 
great mass of consumers.  But gains of this nature rarely if ever move masses of consumers 
to mobilize politically in favor of the policy, much less the reforming regime. Moreover, 
many of the beneficiaries of coverage increases resulting from infrastructure privatization are 
the poor, who are both less organized, and less organizable.  In addition, some consumers, 
particularly poor ones, probably do not associate any gains from reduced tariffs (to the extent 
they even perceive them
26) as having anything to do with privatization of the service.  The 
upshot:  Modest average price declines thrill economists, but not the broader public. 
 
The costs of privatization, in contrast, are concentrated.  They affect a visible, vocal and 
urbanized few—dismissed workers, represented by powerful public sector unions; 
bureaucrats in supervisory ministries that lose their authority, perks and perhaps even raison 
d’etre; managers and board members of public enterprises removed pre- or post-sale, middle-
and upper-income consumers about to lose a service long-furnished at a subsidized price.  
Though the sum of their welfare losses may be, presumably often are, much less than the 
aggregate gain, these actors possess “voice” and access to power; they can and do make their 
needs and views known.    
 
They are motivated to do so because the loss for each affected individual is comparatively 
large and intensely felt, and it occurs in the very short term; indeed, in the case of affected 
workers, often before the completion of the transaction.  Losses of comparatively large 
magnitude, among stakeholders of this nature, typically result in protest, direct political 
action, or equally (if not more) effective bureaucratic delay and misdirection.  It is easier to 
mobilize protest against losses, and generate sympathy for the losers, than to engender 
gratitude for gains.  And the gratitude created by the awarding of any gain is far less 
politically potent than the protest generated by the imposition of an equivalent loss.   
 
This situation is hardly unique to privatization.  A number of liberal economic policy 
reforms—reducing barriers to trade, increasing labor market flexibility, reducing or 
eliminating rent controls, and rationalizing tax regimes are but the first four that come to 
mind—can be shown to generate medium-term economy-wide benefits.  But when they are 
implemented they impose costs on some previously benefiting segment or segments of 
society.  The affected take steps to protect their interests.  They portray the loss as a threat to 
society, not simply to their or their group’s utility:  They are taking away our jobs, and you 
are next; we workers are asked to pay for management’s and politicians’ mistakes; foreigners 
are controlling and misusing our most valuable national resources; national security is being 
weakened, etc.  All this is expected and predictable, the warp and woof of normal political 
life.  The function of the political system is to reconcile the conflicting demands;
27 some 
manage to do so, many do not, at least, not often or for long.    
                                                 
26 Sometimes price reductions (where they occur) are not expressed in consumers’ bills for a year or two.  If  
inflation has remained at even a moderately high level, the average consumer could end up paying more in 
current terms, and the gain would only be seen when a constant currency value is used. 
27 Leroy Jones of Boston University once offered an excellent definition of “political Pareto optimality:” A shift 
in resources in the system such that one actor is made better off without any other actor realizing that someone 
had been made better off. For a discussion of the techniques used by governments that have succeeded in cutting 
back on long-established public subsidies and entitlements, see Pierson (1994).  Four main tools have been   21
 
But privatization is a particularly easy target to hit.  The pain that privatization imposes on 
limited groups arouses sympathy, and is readily described as a cost, or potential cost, to 
society at large.  Pro-privatization arguments are dry, technical and abstract.  Foes of liberal 
reform find in privatization a simple, visible, comprehensible summation of all they oppose.  
Privatization has become a lightning rod and handy scapegoat for all discontent related to 
liberalization and globalization.   
 
Thus, anti-privatization leagues (and forums, workshops, toolkits, strategies, etc.) are 
numerous and popular, and receive strong support from trade unions.  Many journalists, 
academics and other opinion-makers in developing countries share an anti-market 
perspective; they often perceive and portray privatization as imposed, unnecessary, 
unproductive and unfair.  While the negative results of other liberal reforms are sometimes 
too indirect and unclear to spur active opposition, privatization’s costs appear evident.   
 
In addition, supporters of privatization have often misplayed their hand.  Many governments 
(and donors) oversimplified the economic situations faced, and vastly oversold privatization 
as the key to rapid and sustained growth and social progress.  For example, Anatoli Chubias 
famously stated that the Russian privatization voucher would quickly attain the value of a 
Lada car; most Russians found that their vouchers, and the shares for which they could 
exchange them, were valueless.
28 Thus, when the rosy financial claims, and growth and job 
creation predictions were not fulfilled, the backlash was strong.  Many governments have 
been unable to manage the high expectations of consumers and the electorate.   
 
Even in cases where privatization is a clear economic/financial success, and there is no issue 
of price increases for essential infrastructure services, political problems still arise.  For 
example, in several sub-Saharan African states, privatization of commercial firms has 
produced generally good results.  Most are now making profits, they are providing goods and 
services of higher quality and in a more reliable manner.  Job losses were relatively small, 
and the privatized firms are paying better salaries to those fortunate enough to have retained 
their positions.
29  Governments no longer have to subsidize their losses or carry their debts.  
All should be content—but they are not.   
 
In both Zambia and Tanzania, for example, many of the commercial public enterprises, in 
banking, mining, brewing and transport, were purchased by South Africans.  The nationality 
of purchasers is an issue in privatizations around the world; every country is concerned with 
this question, including OECD states.  It is a particularly salient issue in Africa, however——
especially when the buyers are South Africans, nationals of a country that a decade ago was 
                                                                                                                                                          
employed:  informing the public of the costs of past policies and the costs of inaction; informing the public of 
the nature and spread of benefits; dialoguing with and compensating the losers, and—in line with political 
Pareto optimality—“lowering the visibility of costs,” or, more bluntly, “obfuscation.”  
 
28 Similar problems arose in almost all countries that employed vouchers in privatization programs; e.g., the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Lithuania, etc. 
29 Salaries and general job satisfaction tend to be higher in privatized firms than in public enterprises.  Job 
security tends to be lower.  Those likely to be retained post-sale, or obtain work elsewhere if dismissed, are the 
younger, better educated, and male workers.   22
black Africa’s greatest enemy.  Allegations abound that these buyers often act in an 
irresponsible, illegal or inefficient manner.  The objections have some basis in fact—for 
example, the buyer of one Zambian mine fired many workers, despite having promised to 
retain them all, and then failed to pay the legally required severance awards.  While the 
proven cases of misbehavior are few fewer than the claims, they are the ones that catch the 
public’s eye and memory.  These events always count among electorates.
30
 
Yet another major political problem is that of post-privatization firm closures.  A certain 
number of mainly commercial (seldom infrastructure) firms fail post-sale.  That is, that are 
cases where no amount of new and clever management, fresh capital, or labor and other cost 
reductions can save the venture.  Demand is overestimated, the availability or cost of capital 
underestimated, key personnel depart or cannot be found, cost and business forecasts are 
faulty; new, lower-cost competitors arise, and the upshot is firm failure and closure.  No 
quantitative estimates are available on the number of privatized firms that fail to make it,
31 
but it is likely to be as high or higher
32 than the normally prevailing rate of business failure in 
the private sector in the economy in question. 
 
Bankruptcy is a regrettable but normal aspect of business life.  Economists readily justify 
such failure as part of the “creative destruction” of capitalism.  Failure and disappearance of 
firms are seen as productive, necessary processes that take misapplied resources out of the 
hands of the less competent or unlucky, and offer them up again, in the hope and expectation 
that the next user will possess what is needed to put them to more productive and profitable 
work.  In this calculation, society is much better off, in welfare terms, by liquidating a 
persistent loss-maker rather than endlessly subsidizing it.  The economic argument is 
impeccable. 
                                                 
30 Another example:  The non-privatized Tanzanian electricity public enterprise, TANESCO, has long provided 
a poor quality and inadequate quality of service.  Brown- and black-outs are very common, and at present, its 
debts to government exceed $800 million US. After repeated failed attempts in the 1990s to improve 
performance, liberalize the sector and privatize the firm, the Tanzanian Government, under pressure from 
donors, decided on the interim solution of a Management Contract.  An experienced South African firm won the 
competition.  Under private management since 2002, the technical and financial performance of the firm has 
improved greatly (though the debt overhang remains to be resolved), in good part because TANESCO has 
reduced its internal operating costs and is for the first time cutting service to non-payers, including government 
offices. Tanzanians in and outside TANESCO interviewed in June of 2005, including workers in the firm, 
acknowledge the performance improvements.  Still, there is some bitterness and dismay that a handful of white 
South African managers has been able to do in three years what Tanzanian managers could not accomplish in 
40. The fact that the expatriate managers are very well rewarded for their services (in addition to base pay, they 
receive a portion of the financial savings attributable to performance improvements) is a compounding matter.  
The level of public grumbling is such that, despite the much improved electricity situation, the Government is 
under some pressure to terminate the contract and reinstate Tanzanian management.  
31 Megginson and Netter (2001) state that privatization improves performance in between two-thirds and three-
quarters of cases.  Presumably, performance either remains the same or deteriorates in between one-quarter to 
one-third of privatizations.  This provides something of an “upper bound” estimate of the percentage of 
privatized firms that fail. 
32 Higher because privatized firms often inherit conditions that impede rapid transition to “lean, clean and mean” 
performance in competitive markets. Many studies from transition countries contrasting the performance of 
different types of firms rank new entry or “de novo” firms as the most productive and dynamic; then privatized 
companies, and last, state-owned firms.  The gap between the de novo set and the privatized is often larger than 
between privatized and state-owned.     23
 
But as another economist (Oliver Williamson) has said, “politics usually trumps economics.”  
No political system will welcome, and few have been able to manage well, the popular 
discontent stemming from a wholesale closure of firms and hemorrhage of jobs.  A few 
closures may be tolerated; a flood of shut-downs will almost certainly result in government 
efforts to try to soften the blow.  This is particularly true when alternative jobs are scarce, and 
even if found, may entail longer hours, less security of tenure, and fewer fringe benefits.
33  
So the  political economy conundrum of privatization is this:  When privatization goes well, 
it is close to invisible and taken for granted; when it goes wrong—as it frequently does for 






Privatization is a widely applied economic policy.  It has, incontestably, produced substantial 
economic benefits by raising profitability and efficiency in firms, by providing financial 
resources to strapped governments, and by signaling to creditors, investors and donors the 
seriousness and credibility of a government’s shift in economic regime.   
 
In developing countries, privatization has most successfully been applied in commercial, 
industrial, manufacturing and service firms operating in competitive markets. This form of 
privatization has generally proven its worth:  Consumers appreciate improvements in terms 
of quality and quantity of good or services produced—even when prices increase, which is 
far from the general case.  In most countries, complaints about this sort of privatization have 
been relatively muted and short-lived.  Citizenries may not like the job losses or the foreign 
ownership of breweries, banks, mines and hotels, but the matter rarely reaches the level of 
street demonstrations.  The more important issue, economically and politically, is that of 
infrastructure privatization. 
 
On this issue, the first point to note is that privatization has also produced improvements in 
infrastructure sectors in many developing countries, most often and obviously in 
telecommunications (where technological change has made competition relatively easy to 
introduce and maintain, and private provision has become the norm) and transport, less 
sweepingly but steadily in electricity, and more problematically in water.  What is often 
overlooked is that, even in the more difficult sectors and settings, private involvement in 
infrastructure generally produces results superior to those previously attained by the public 
                                                 
33 The question of what happens to workers laid off because of privatization needs more  study.  In Mexico and 
Brazil, follow up surveys show that about half of persons laid off found other formal sector employment within 
12 months of dismissal.  In both cases, wages were about the same.  In Brazil, the new jobs required longer 
hours and entailed fewer benefits.  In contrast, in Mexico, 45 to 50 percent of those dismissed  found jobs in the 
same sector and obtained about the same level of benefits and health coverage.  (Mckenzie and Mookherjee, 
2005, p. 68) 
34 And those politicians who have stood by privatization until the bitter end—Anatoli Chubias in Russia, Roger 
Douglas in New Zealand, Carlos Menem in Argentina, for example—have paid a high political price for their 
tenacity.   24
provider.
35   For example, a review of seven “private participation in infrastructure” cases in 
sub-Saharan Africa concluded that none of these privatizations produced levels of service 
and cost recovery comparable to best practice in industrialized countries.  All suffered from 
financial or political problems (or both).  Still, all the results were “better compared to what 
outcomes would have been without private sector contracts.”  (Castilla Strategic Advisors, 
2005, 1)  A second set of African case studies, by Gökgür, Jammal and Jones (2005), reaches 
much the same conclusion.  The financial and operational improvements made under private 
provision need to be better disseminated. 
 
Despite the comparative success, infrastructure privatization remains a problem, especially in 
low-income countries, and most acutely in the electricity and water and sewerage sectors.  
There, because of the essential nature of the goods produced, because of the level of 
decrepitude of the businesses being privatized, because of the unwillingness or inability of 
governments to impose costs on elites, and because of the relative power of the private 
investors vis-à-vis the civil servants they deal with before and after the transaction, it has 
proven hard to construct credible and enduring transactions.   A number of renegotiations, 
non-renewals, and outright cancellations of contracts have occurred. (Harris, 2003)   Because 
of the problems, it has proven easy to cast privatization—not just in infrastructure but across 
the board—in the role of a (or even the) social villain; the tool of the rich, the foreign, the 
corrupt.  In sum, privatization has everywhere and inevitably proven to be an intensely 
political event, even more than most other economic reform measures.     
 
What next? 
Many public policies move in and out of fashion, but few have shifted in pendulum-like manner 
to the extent of privatization.  More than a decade ago, Gomez-Ibañez and Meyer (1993) wrote 
of the cyclical process of privatization and nationalization.  (see also Klein and Roger, 1994)  
The idea is that private provision of utility services eventually, inevitably, leads to conflicts over 
what price the provider may charge to cover costs, and what is a “reasonable” return on 
investment. A common response is more and more strenuous government intervention and 
regulation.  This decreases returns and causes the private operators to quit the market, and/or to 
the government takeover of the service.  But this solution too is short-lived.  Populist pricing, 
insufficient investment, and a failure to sustain reform short of ownership change lead to 
problems of both quantity and quality of service—provoking once more the increasing 
involvement of the private sector, first as managers and financiers, sometimes as owners of the 
utility.  And the cycle begins anew. 
 
Privatization events roughly approximate this model in many developing countries. Are we then 
at the stage where a wave of renationalizations might occur?   The answer is, no.  The past never 
simply reoccurs; the next cycle will encounter a changed political-economic landscape.  For 
prime example, the preceding wave of nationalization in developing countries involved many 
firms producing tradable goods as well as infrastructure services.  As noted, few sustained anti-
                                                 
35 The most shocking aspect of the cancelled lease contract in urban water in Tanzania, mentioned above, was 
that this was a rare case where the private operator did worse, by a variety of technical and financial measures, 
than its public enterprise predecessor.  Far more often the problem is that a financially exhausted government 
allows a private operator to charge a cost-covering tariff, or contracts to allow tariffs to rise in line with input 
prices, and this at once or eventually provokes a public outcry, protests, and a political crisis.     25
privatization protests have centered on the divestiture of manufacturing, industrial or non-
infrastructure services.  No leader, either in left-leaning Argentina, Brazil or even  Venezuela (or 
Russia, for a non-Latin example), has yet seriously suggested the renationalization of privatized 
commercial or industrial concerns (with the possible exception of banks and the 
energy/petroleum sector; e.g., in Bolivia—and even here the outcome is, at time of writing, 
unclear).  The likelihood is high that all these divestitures will be allowed to stand; the legitimate 
arena for private action has been expanded.
36
 
Utilities, as usual, present a more complex story.  First, outside of telecommunications, declining 
investor interest has made it difficult to launch any new concession, much less outright 
purchases. Few private operators are presently willing to invest equity and take major and long 
term risks in emerging market utilities. Investors that remain are looking for management 
contracts or carefully hedged leases with most if not all of the commercial risk being borne by 
governments. Second, a number of governments, shaken—and in a few cases removed from 
office—by public outcry centering on infrastructure privatizations, have become equally 
unwilling to undertake such ventures.   
 
However, the underlying factors that led initially to private provision of infrastructure have not 
disappeared:  Relentlessly increasing demand for infrastructure services, decaying networks and 
poor public enterprise performance, and exhausted state budgets leave many governments with 
little choice but to continue the search for private infrastructure partners.  The constraints are 
revealed in time of crisis:  In many (of the relatively few) instances of cancelled lease and 
concession contracts, governments have immediately sought to re-bid the contract to another 
private provider.   
 
The point is that, despite problems and contract woes, most developing states are far more open 
and more integrated into world capital markets than they were a decade ago.  Few will take 
drastic steps that would further alarm or threaten markets.  Most are still financially strapped, and 
most will require the approval and involvement of the international financial institutions in 
further, still badly needed, infrastructure expansion and reform.  While the IFIs will be much less 
insistent on ownership change as a sine qua non of infrastructure reform, they will (it is hoped) 
recall the extent to which their previous infrastructure reform efforts, without private sector 
involvement, were ineffectual and counterproductive.   A major question is whether this time 
around the governments and IFIs can learn the lessons of the past and jointly devise—and sell to 
the public—reform mechanisms that give incentives and comfort to reputable private investors, 
that create and sustain the policy and regulatory institutions that make governments competent 
and honest partners with the private operators, while at the same time protecting consumers, 




                                                 
36 The test will come when (if) some of these privatized firms fail or otherwise go out of business.  Particularly if 
they are large employers, or the only employment source in a region, governments will be greatly tempted to 
renationalize them simply to keep them alive and maintain jobs.  Indeed, many commercial firms originally became 
state enterprises, in India, Mexico and elsewhere, because governments would not allow them to disappear the first 
time they failed.   26
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